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Viminitz concludes his not-easy-reading paper as follows: "So, what follows
from all or any of this? Well, among other things, that there are some situations
- more instructively, situations involving this recursivity feature - in which the
rationality (or irrationality) of an action seems to be, in a highly instructive
sense, independent of that action's expected utility. Provided only that the
action at the head of the recursion would be countenanced because of its
expected utility, an action down the recursion line can inherit that sanctionability
even if its own expected utility would counsel against it. And that, I submit,
might have very important consequences indeed." In particular, it leads him to
go into Chicken theory pretty quickly; re which, he says,
And so why - in the absence of a pre-commitment strategy in the
meta-game - are we destined to crash? Because this reversive
penetration is recursive. In other words, rational choice theory is
stymied in Chicken because it is stymied in Deer Hunter. And it is
stymied in Deer Hunter because it has yet to develop an account of
maximizing under conditions of recursive reversivity.
Paul's reasoning is strong here, and if, as he implies at the end, he doesn't
have this all sorted out, I certainly don't. Still, for situations like his widget-
producers, most of us humans spot an easy solution: split the difference
(yielding 3 for me, 4 for you, dividing the cooperative surplus equally a la
Gauthier's MRC.) This solution can be modified by all sorts of things. In fact, it
is solved differently with a private-property regime, as Gauthier in effect also
showed with his example of hired lab assistants versus Yukon gold-strike
claimants. If I own the factory, you take the best offer you can get from me,
which is made with an eye on the labor pool; if it's tiny, you get more; if large,
less. But if we are joint owners with equal capital investments, we split fifty-fifty.
And so on.
These time-proven human solutions work because we all know (intuitively,
anyway) the sort of problem he's pointing to here, and because our budgets of
time and trouble are comparable. If they are not, of course, we'll again get
different results: the tourist in the Arab souks, due to board the plane in three
hours, will pay more than the seasoned tourist in no hurry, and even he will pay
more than the very seasoned fellow Arab who can wait forever and knows
exactly what the score is.
Reality makes a lot of difference in these matters, though it tends to be ignored
in game-theoretic analysis. We may surmise that some such factor accounts
for the whole of the deer hunter situation: enemy boredom, lack of scruple or
fellow-feeling, curiosity, and so on all enter in to induce the VC leader to allow,
in the moments he has available for decision, the 3-bullet load for Mike and
Nick. Paul is surely right that "if the Round 3 player should rebel rather than
comply, the VC should never have let him have the gun after Round 2!", with its
further implication at another recursion.
Here's another weakish thought. As a former colleague of mine once pointed
out, the odd thing about games as they occur in game theory is that nobody
actually plays them. The theory of game analyzes a given game, shows which
moves are the logically best ones at each move, and who wins (if it's the sort of
game you win or lose), and then if real people propose to play that game, and
have done the mathematics (or read the article), there'd be no point in playing
it - indeed, there would be no possibility of literally playing it at all. Why bother
to kick off at the start if both sides knew exactly how it was all going to go and
who would win? If they did "play", it wouldn't be playing - it would be a rather
hard-knocks sort of ballet.
In real games, game theory would seem to be a very limited resource. Indeed,
a good deal of the thinking that goes on in games addresses the sort of issues
for which Clausewitz is famed for pointing to: After you've made all your plans
in the light of all the known facts, expect everything to go totally awry in about
the first ten minutes. Nothing will go as planned. In real-life games, I suppose, it
is more or less that way too.
That provides only a weak answer to the paradox Viminitz has presented, and
in a sense it's not a real answer at that. But it's probably relevant at some level
anyway. In particular, I think it's pretty relevant to moral philosophy. People have
talked about "rule utilitarianism" in hopes of heading off some problems
apparently generated by utilitarianism. But the best theory we have shows that
utilitiarianism is wrong from the start, so there's no real point in rule
utilitiarianism. On the other hand, the general sort of view that David Gauthier
and Hobbes have developed, and to which I broadly subscribe, is the right sort
of theory. That plus the points about how the real world is, and is known to be,
suggest the correctness of the sort of moral principles advocated by Hobbes.
Rational maximizers looking at the real world and asking what protections
would come in handy will see that general principles, especially Hobbes' first
principle of Seeking Peace and confining war to defense, are an extremely
good general bet for this purpose. Yes, there'll be all sorts of variations in
specific power-relations among people from time to time, and especially,
enough to make it not plausibly predictable that any given person will enjoy
advantages of that kind for long; and if we're going to try to resort to the
strategy of trotting out principles for adjudicating disputes, we can't do better
than principles that are thoroughly general and impartial.
So we do (or try to).
Of course, in a world in which people lived up to those rules, problems like
Deer Hunter will crop up mainly in movies and in the ruminations of game
theorists. Which doesn't mean they aren't worth thinking about, but may mean
that solutions, whether or not forthcoming, aren't likely to be much real use.
 
